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Abstract
In the field of Artificial Intelligence many models for decision making under un-
certainty have been proposed that deviate from the traditional models used in Deci-
sion Theory, i.e. the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model and its many variants.
These models aim at obtaining simple decision rules that can be implemented by
efficient algorithms while based on inputs that are less rich than what is required in
traditional models. One of these models, called the likely dominance (LD) model,
consists in declaring that an act is preferred to another as soon as the set of states on
which the first act gives a better outcome than the second act is judged more likely
than the set of states on which the second act is preferable. The LD model is at much
variance with the SEU model. Indeed, it has a definite ordinal flavor and it may
lead to preference relations between acts that are not transitive. This paper proposes
a general model for decision making under uncertainty tolerating intransitive and/or
incomplete preferences that will contain both the SEU and the LD models as particu-
lar cases. Within the framework of this general model, we propose a characterization
of the preference relations that can be obtained with the LD model. This characteri-
zation shows that the main distinctive feature of such relations lies in the very poor
relation comparing preference differences that they induce on the set of outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The specific needs of Artificial Intelligence techniques have led many Computer Scien-
tists to propose models for decision under uncertainty that are at variance with the classi-
cal models used in Decision Theory, i.e. the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model and
its many variants (see Fishburn, 1988; Wakker, 1989, for overviews). This gives rise to
what is often called “qualitative decision theory” (see Boutilier, 1994; Brafman and Ten-
nenholtz, 1997, 2000; Doyle and Thomason, 1999; Dubois et al., 1997, 2001; Lehmann,
1996; Tan and Pearl, 1994, for overviews). These models aim at obtaining simple decision
rules that can be implemented by efficient algorithms while based on inputs that are less
rich than what is required in traditional models. This can be achieved, e.g. comparing acts
only on the basis of their consequences in the most plausible states (Boutilier, 1994; Tan
and Pearl, 1994) or refining the classical criteria (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Milnor, 1954) for
decision making under complete ignorance (see Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2000; Dubois
et al., 2001).
One such model, called the “likely dominance” (LD) model, was recently proposed
by Dubois et al. (1997) and later studied in Dubois et al. (2003a, 2002) and Fargier and
Perny (1999). It consists in declaring that an act a is preferred to an act b as soon as the
set of states for which a gives a better outcome than b is judged “more likely” than the
set of states for which b gives a better outcome than a. Such a way of comparing acts has
a definite ordinal flavor. It rests on a simple “voting” analogy and can be implemented
as soon as a preference relation on the set of outcomes and a likelihood relation between
subsets of states (i.e. events) are known. Contrary to the other models mentioned above,
simple examples inspired from Condorcet’s paradox (see Sen, 1986) show that the LD
model does not always lead to preference relations between acts that are complete or
transitive. Such relations are therefore quite different from the ones usually dealt with in
Decision Theory.
Previous characterizations (see Dubois et al., 2003a, 2002; Fargier and Perny, 1999)
of the relations that can be obtained using the LD model (of, for short, LD relations)
have emphasized their “ordinal” character via the use of variants of a “noncompensation”
condition introduced in Fishburn (1975, 1976, 1978) that have been thoroughly studied in
the area of multiple criteria decision making (see Bouyssou, 1986, 1992; Bouyssou and
Vansnick, 1986; Dubois et al., 2003b; Fargier and Perny, 2001; Vansnick, 1986). Since
this condition is wholly specific to such relations, these characterizations are not perfectly
suited to capture their essential distinctive features within a more general framework that
would also include more traditional preference relations.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first introduce a general axiomatic frame-
work for decision under uncertainty that will contain both the SEU and LD models as
particular cases. This general framework tolerating incomplete and/or intransitive pref-
erences is based on related work in the area of conjoint measurement (see Bouyssou and
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Pirlot, 2002). The second aim of this paper is to propose an alternative characterization of
the preference relations that can be obtained using the likely dominance rule within this
general framework. This characterization will allow us to emphasize the main distinctive
feature of such relations, i.e. the poor relation comparing preference differences that they
induce on the set of outcomes. This analysis specializes the one in Bouyssou and Pirlot
(2004b) to the case of decision making under uncertainty.
It should be noticed that the interest of studying models tolerating intransitive pref-
erences was forcefully argued by Fishburn (1991). It has already generated much work
(see, e.g. Fishburn, 1982, 1984, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991; Fishburn and Lavalle, 1987a,b,
1988; Lavalle and Fishburn, 1987; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Nakamura, 1998; Sugden,
1993). These models all use some form of an additive nontransitive model. The orig-
inality of our approach is to replace additivity by a mere decomposability requirement
which, at the cost of much weaker uniqueness results, allows for a very simple axiomatic
treatment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our setting and notation. The
LD model is introduced in section 3. Our general framework for decision making under
uncertainty is presented and analyzed in section 4. Section 5 characterize the relations
that can be obtained using the LD model within our general framework. A final section
discusses our results and presents several extensions of our analysis. An appendix con-
tains examples showing the independence of the conditions used in the paper. The rest of
this section is devoted to our, classical, vocabulary concerning binary relations.
A binary relation R on a set X is a subset of X × X; we write a R b instead of
(a, b) ∈ R. A binary relation R on X is said to be:
• reflexive if [a R a],
• complete if [a R b or b R a],
• symmetric if [a R b] ⇒ [b R a],
• asymmetric if [a R b] ⇒ [Not [b R a]],
• transitive if [a R b and b R c] ⇒ [a R c],
• Ferrers if [(a R b and c R d) ⇒ (a R d or c R b)],
• semi-transitive if [(a R b and b R c) ⇒ (a R d or d R c)]
for all a, b, c, d ∈ X .
A weak order (resp. an equivalence) is a complete and transitive (resp. reflexive, sym-
metric and transitive) binary relation. If R is an equivalence on X , X/R will denote the
set of equivalence classes of R on X . An interval order is a complete and Ferrers binary
relation. A semiorder is a semi-transitive interval order.
47
On some ordinal models for decision making under uncertainty
2 The setting
We adopt a classical setting for decision under uncertainty with a finite number of states.
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, . . .} be the set of outcomes and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of states.
It is understood that the elements of N are exhaustive and mutually exclusive: one and
only one state will turn out to be true. An act is a function from N to Γ. The set of all
acts is denoted by A = ΓN . Acts will be denoted by lowercase letters a, b, c, d, . . .. An
act a ∈ A therefore associates to each state i ∈ N an outcome a(i) ∈ Γ. We often abuse
notation and write ai instead of a(i).
Among the elements of A are constant acts, i.e. acts giving the same outcome in all
states. We denote α the constant act giving the outcome α ∈ Γ in all states i ∈ N . Let
E ⊆ N and a, b ∈ A. We denote aEb the act c ∈ A such that ci = ai, for all i ∈ E and
ci = bi, for all i ∈ N \ E. Similarly αEb will denote the act d ∈ A such that di = α, for
all i ∈ E and di = bi, for all i ∈ N \ E. When E = {i} we write aib and αib instead of
a{i}b and α{i}b.
In this paper  will always denote a binary relation on the set A. The binary relation
 is interpreted as an “at least as good as” preference relation between acts. We note 
(resp. ∼) the asymmetric (resp. symmetric) part of . A similar convention holds when
 is starred, superscripted and/or subscripted. The relation  induces a relation Γ on
the set Γ of outcomes via the comparison of constant acts letting:
α Γ β ⇔ α  β.
Let E be a nonempty subset of N . We define the relation E on A letting, for all
a, b ∈ A,
a E b ⇔ [aEc  bEc, for all c ∈ A].
When E = {i} we write i instead of {i}.
If, for all a, b ∈ A, aEc  bEc, for some c ∈ A, implies a E b, we say that  is
independent for E. If  is independent for all nonempty subsets of states we say that 
is independent. It is not difficult to see that a binary relation is independent if and only if
it is independent for N \ {i}, for all i ∈ N (see Wakker, 1989). Independence as defined
here is therefore nothing else than the Sure Thing Principle (postulate P2) introduced by
Savage (1954).
We say that state i ∈ N is influent (for) if there are α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ and a, b ∈ A such
that αia  βib and Not [γia  δib] and degenerate otherwise. It is clear that a degenerate
state has no influence whatsoever on the comparison of the elements of A and may be
suppressed from N . In order to avoid unnecessary minor complications, we suppose
henceforth that all states in N are influent. Note that this does not rule out the existence
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of null events E ⊆ N , i.e. such that aEc ∼ bEc, for all a, b, c ∈ A. This is exemplified
below.
Example 1
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and Γ = R. Let p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 1/4. Define  on A letting
a  b ⇔
∑
i ∈ S(a,b)
pi ≥
∑
j ∈ S(b,a)
pj − 1/4.
for all a, b ∈ A, where S(a, b) = {i ∈ N : ai ≥ bi}. With such a relation, it is easy to
see that all states are influent while they are all null. Observe that is complete but is not
transitive. We shall shortly see that this relation can be obtained with the LD model. 
3 The likely dominance model
The following definition, building on Dubois et al. (1997) and Fargier and Perny (1999),
formalizes the idea of a LD relation, i.e., of a preference relation that has been obtained
comparing acts by pairs on the basis of the “likelihood” of the states favoring each element
of the pair.
Definition 1 (LD relations)
Let  be a reflexive binary relation on A. We say that  is a LD relation if there are:
• a complete binary relation S on Γ,
• a binary relation  between subsets of N having N for union that is monotonic
w.r.t. inclusion, i.e. such that for all A,B,C,D ⊆ N ,
[A  B,C ⊇ A,B ⊇ D,C ∪D = N ] ⇒ C  D, (1)
such that, for all a, b ∈ A,
a  b ⇔ S(a, b)  S(b, a), (2)
where S(a, b) = {i ∈ N : ai S bi}. We say that 〈, S〉 is a representation of .
Hence, when  is a LD relation, the preference between a and b only depends on the
subsets of states favoring a or b in terms of the complete relation S. It does not depend
on “preference differences” between outcomes besides what is indicated by S. A major
advantage of the LD model is that it can be applied to compare acts as soon as there is a
binary relation allowing to compare outcomes and a relation allowing to compare events
in terms of likelihood.
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Let  be a LD relation with a representation 〈, S〉. We denote by I (resp. P) the
symmetric part (resp. asymmetric part) of S. For all A,B ⊆ N , we define the relations,
 and  between subsets of N having N for union letting: A  B ⇔ [A  B and B 
A], A  B ⇔ [A  B and Not [B  A]], A  B ⇔ [Not [A  B] and Not [B  A]].
The following lemma takes note of some elementary properties of LD relations; it
uses the hypothesis that all states are influent.
Lemma 1
If  is a LD relation with a representation 〈, S〉, then:
1. P is nonempty,
2. for all A,B ⊆ N such that A∪B = N exactly one of A  B, B  A, A  B and
A  B holds and we have N  N ,
3. for all A ⊆ N , N  A,
4. N  ∅,
5.  is independent,
6.  is marginally complete, i.e., for all i ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a ∈ A, αia  βia
or βia  αia,
7. S = Γ,
8. for all i ∈ N and all a, b ∈ A, either a i b ⇔ ai S bi or a ∼i b,
9.  has a unique representation.
PROOF
Part 1. If P is empty, then, since S is complete, S(a, b) = N , for all a, b ∈ A. Hence, for
all i ∈ N , all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ, and all a, b ∈ A,
S(αia, βib) = S(γia, δib) and
S(βib, αia) = S(δib, γia).
This implies, using (2), that state i ∈ N is degenerate, contrarily to our hypothesis.
Part 2. Since the relation P is nonempty and S is complete, for all A,B ⊆ N such
that A ∪ B = N , there are a, b ∈ A such that S(a, b) = A and S(b, a) = B. We have,
by construction, exactly one of a  b, b  a, a ∼ b and [Not [a  b] and Not [b  a]].
Hence, using (2), we have exactly one of A  B, B  A, A  B and A  B. Since the
relation S is complete, we have S(a, a) = N . Using the reflexivity of , we know that
a ∼ a, so that (2) implies N  N .
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Parts 3 and 4. Let A ⊆ N . Because N  N , the monotonicity of  implies N  A.
Suppose that ∅  N . Then the monotonicity of  would imply that A  B, for all
A,B ⊆ N such that A∪B = N . This would contradict the fact that each state is influent.
Part 5. Using the completeness of S, we have, for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ and all a, b ∈ A,
S(αia, αib) = S(βia, βib) and
S(αib, αia) = S(βib, βia).
Using (2), this implies that, for all i ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a, b ∈ A, αia  αib ⇔
βia  βib. Therefore,  is independent for N \ {i} and, hence, independent.
Part 6 follows from the fact that S is complete, N  N and N  N \ {i}, for all
i ∈ N .
Part 7. Suppose that α Γ β so that α  β and Not [α S β]. Since S is complete, we
have β P α. Using (2) and N  ∅, we have β  α, a contradiction. Conversely, if α S β
we obtain, using (2) and the fact that N  A, for all A ⊆ N , α  β so that α Γ β.
Part 8. Let i ∈ N . We know that N  N and N  N \ {i}. If N  N \ {i}, then (2)
implies a i b for all a, b ∈ A. Otherwise we have N  N \ {i} and N  N . It follows
that α S β ⇒ α i β and α P β ⇒ α i β. Since S and i are complete, it follows that
S = i.
Part 9. Suppose that  is a LD relation with a representation 〈, S〉. Suppose that 
has another representation 〈′, S′〉. Using part 7, we know that S = S′ = Γ. Using (2),
it follows that  = ′. 
4 A general framework for decision under uncertainty
tolerating intransitive preferences
We consider in this section binary relations  on A that can be represented as:
a  b ⇔ F (p(a1, b1), p(a2, b2), . . . , p(an, bn)) ≥ 0 (UM)
where p is a real-valued function on Γ2 that is skew symmetric (i.e. such that p(α, β) =
−p(β, α), for all α, β ∈ Γ) and F is a real-valued function on ∏ni=1 p(Γ2) being nonde-
creasing in all its arguments and such that, abusing notation, F (0) ≥ 0.
It is useful to interpret p as a function measuring preference differences between out-
comes. The fact that p is supposed to be skew symmetric means that the preference
difference between α and β is the opposite of the preference difference between β and α,
which seems a reasonable hypothesis for preference differences. With this interpretation
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in mind, the acts a and b are compared as follows. In each state i ∈ N , the preference
difference between ai and bi is computed. The synthesis of these preference differences is
performed applying the function F . If this synthesis is positive, we conclude that a  b.
Given this interpretation, it seems reasonable to suppose that F is nondecreasing in each
of its arguments. The fact that F (0) ≥ 0 simply means that the synthesis of null prefer-
ence differences in each state should be nonnegative; this ensures that will be reflexive.
Model (UM) is the specialization to the case of decision making under uncertainty of
conjoint measurement models studied in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002).
It is not difficult to see that model (UM) encompasses preference relations  on A
that are neither transitive nor complete. It is worth noting that this model is sufficiently
flexible to contain many others as particular cases including:
• the SEU model (see, e.g. Wakker, 1989) in which:
a  b ⇔
n∑
i=1
wiu(ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
wiu(bi) (SEU)
where wi are nonnegative real numbers that add up to one and u is a real-valued
function on Γ,
• the Skew Symmetric Additive model (SSA) (see Fishburn, 1988, 1990) in which
a  b ⇔
n∑
i=1
wiΦ(ai, bi) ≥ 0 (SSA)
where wi are nonnegative real numbers that add up to one and Φ is a skew symmet-
ric (Φ(α, β) = −Φ(β, α)) real-valued function on Γ2.
We will show in the next section that model (UM) also contains all LD relations. As
shown below, model (UM) implies that  is independent. It is therefore not suited to
cope with violations of the Sure Thing Principle that have been widely documented in
the literature (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which can be
done, e.g. using Choquet Expected Utility or Cumulative Prospect Theory (see Chew and
Karni, 1994; Gilboa, 1987; Karni and Schmeidler, 1991; Luce, 2000; Nakamura, 1990;
Schmeidler, 1989; Wakker, 1989, 1994, 1996; Wakker and Tversky, 1993).
The flexibility of model (UM) may obscure some of its properties. We summarize
what appears to be the most important ones in the following.
Lemma 2
Let  be a binary relation on A that has a representation in model (UM). Then:
1.  is reflexive, independent and marginally complete,
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2. [a i b for all i ∈ J ⊆ N ] ⇒ [a J b],
3. Γ is complete.
PROOF
Part 1. The reflexivity of  follows from the skew symmetry of p and F (0) ≥ 0. In-
dependence follows from the fact that p(α, α) = 0, for all α ∈ Γ. Not[αia  βia] and
Not[βia  αia] imply, abusing notation, F ([p(α, β)]i, [0]−i) < 0 and F ([p(β, α)]i, [0]−i)
< 0. Since F (0) ≥ 0 and F is nondecreasing, we have p(α, β) < 0 and p(β, α) < 0,
which contradicts the skew symmetry of p. Hence,  is marginally complete.
Part 2. Observe that α i β is equivalent to F ([p(α, β)]i, [0]−i) ≥ 0 and F ([p(β, α)]i,
[0]−i) < 0. Since F (0) ≥ 0 we know that p(β, α) < 0 using the nondecreasingness of F .
The skew symmetry of p implies p(α, β) > 0 > p(β, α) and the desired property easily
follows using the nondecreasingness of F .
Part 3. Because p is skew symmetric, we have, for all α, β ∈ Γ, p(α, β) ≥ 0 or
p(β, α) ≥ 0. Since F (0) ≥ 0, the completeness of Γ follows from the nondecreasing-
ness of F . 
The analysis of model (UM) heavily rests on the study of induced relations comparing
preference differences on the set of outcomes. The interest of such relations was already
powerfully stressed by Wakker (1988, 1989) (note however that, although we use similar
notation, our definitions differs from his).
Definition 2 (Relations comparing preference differences)
Let  be a binary relation on A. We define the binary relations ∗ and ∗∗ on Γ2 letting,
for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ,
(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ) ⇔ [for all a, b ∈ A and all i ∈ N, γia  δib ⇒ αia  βib],
(α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ) ⇔ [(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ) and (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α)].
The asymmetric and symmetric parts of ∗ are respectively denoted by ∗ and ∼∗, a
similar convention holding for ∗∗. By construction, ∗ and ∗∗ are reflexive and transi-
tive. Therefore, ∼∗ and ∼∗∗ are equivalence relations. Note that, by construction, ∗∗ is
reversible, i.e. (α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ) ⇔ (δ, γ) ∗∗ (β, α).
We note a few useful connections between ∗ and  in the following lemma.
Lemma 3
1.  is independent if and only if (iff) (α, α) ∼∗ (β, β), for all α, β ∈ Γ
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2. For all a, b, c, d ∈ A, all i ∈ N and all α, β ∈ Γ
[a  b and (ci, di) ∗ (ai, bi)] ⇒ cia  dib, (3)
[(cj, dj) ∼∗ (aj, bj), for all j ∈ N ] ⇒ [a  b ⇔ c  d]. (4)
PROOF
Part 1. It is clear that [ is independent] ⇔ [ is independent for N \ {i}, for all i ∈ N ].
Observe that [ is independent for N \ {i}, for all i ∈ N ] ⇔ [αia  αib ⇔ βia  βib,
for all α, β ∈ Γ, all i ∈ N and all a, b ∈ A ] ⇔ [(α, α) ∼∗ (β, β) for all α, β ∈ Γ ].
Part 2. (3) is clear from the definition of ∗, (4) follows. 
The following conditions are an adaptation to the case of decision making under uncer-
tainty of conditions used in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002) in the context of conjoint mea-
surement. They will prove will prove central in what follows.
Definition 3 (Conditions URC1 and URC2)
Let  be a binary relation on A. This relation is said to satisfy:
URC1 if
αia  βib
and
γjc  δjd

⇒


γia  δib
or
αjc  βjd,
URC2 if
αia  βib
and
βjc  αjd

⇒


γia  δib
or
δjc  γjd,
for all i, j ∈ N , all a, b, c, d ∈ A and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ.
Condition URC1 suggests that, independently of the state i ∈ N , either the difference
(α, β) is at least as large as the difference (γ, δ) of vice versa. Indeed, suppose that αia 
βib and Not [γia  δib]. This is the sign that the preference difference between α and β
appears to be larger than the preference difference between γ and δ. Therefore if γjc 
δjd, we should have αjc  βjd, which is URC1. Similarly, condition URC2 suggests that
the preference difference (α, β) is linked to the “opposite” preference difference (β, α).
Indeed if αia  βib and Not [γia  δib], so that the difference between γ and δ is not
larger than the difference between α and β, URC2 implies that βjc  αjd should imply
δjc  γjd, so that the difference between δ and γ is not smaller than the difference
between β and α. The following lemma summarizes the main consequences of URC1
and URC2.
Lemma 4
1. URC1 ⇔ [∗ is complete],
2. URC2 ⇔
[for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ,Not [(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ)] ⇒ (β, α) ∗ (δ, γ)],
54
Annales du LAMSADE n◦3
3. [URC1 and URC2] ⇔ [∗∗ is complete].
4. In the class of reflexive relations, URC1 and URC2 are independent conditions.
5. URC2 ⇒ [ is independent].
PROOF
Part 1. Suppose that URC1 is violated so that αia  βib, γjc  δjd, Not [γia  δib] and
Not [αjc  βjd]. This is equivalent to Not [(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ)] and Not [(γ, δ) ∗ (α, β)].
Part 2. Suppose that URC2 is violated so that αia  βib, βjc  αjd, Not [γia  δib]
andNot [δjc  γjd]. This is equivalent toNot [(γ, δ) ∗ (α, β)] andNot [(δ, γ) ∗ (β, α)].
Part 3 easily follows from parts 1 and 2.
Part 4: see examples 2 and 3 in appendix.
Part 5. Suppose that αia  αib. Using URC2 implies βia  βib, for all β ∈ Γ. Hence,
 is independent. 
The following lemma shows that all relations satisfying model (UM) satisfy URC1 and
URC2; this should be no surprise since within model (UM) the skew symmetric function
p induces on Γ2 a reversible weak order.
Lemma 5
Let be a binary relation on A. If has a representation in model (UM) then satisfies
URC1 and URC2.
PROOF
[URC1]. Suppose that αia  βib and γjc  δjd. Using model (UM) we have:
F ([p(α, β)]i, [p(ak, bk)]k =i) ≥ 0 and F ([p(γ, δ)]j, [p(c, d)]=j) ≥ 0,
with [·]i denoting the ith argument of F . If p(α, β) ≥ p(γ, δ) then using the nonde-
creasingness of F , we have F ([p(α, β)]j, [p(c, d)]=j) ≥ 0 so that αjc  βjd. If
p(α, β) < p(γ, δ) we have F ([p(γ, δ)]i, [p(ak, bk)]k =i) ≥ 0 so that γia  δib. Hence
URC1 holds.
[URC2]. Similarly, suppose that αia  βib and βjc  αjd. We thus have:
F ([p(α, β)]i, [p(ak, bk)]k =i) ≥ 0 and F ([p(β, α)]j, [p(c, d)]=j) ≥ 0.
If p(α, β) ≥ p(γ, δ), the skew symmetry of p implies p(δ, γ) ≥ p(β, α). Using the nonde-
creasingness of F , we have F ([p(δ, γ)]j, [p(c, d)]=j) ≥ 0, so that δjc  γjd. Similarly,
if p(α, β) < p(γ, δ), we have, using the nondecreasingness of F , F ([p(γ, δ)]i, [p(ak, bk)]k =i)
≥ 0 so that γia  δib. Hence URC2 holds. 
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It turns out that conditions URC1 and URC2 allow to completely characterize model
(UM) when Γ/∼∗∗ is finite or countably infinite.
Theorem 1
Let  be a binary relation on A. If Γ/∼∗∗ is finite or countably infinite, then  has a
representation (UM) iff it is reflexive and satisfies URC1 and URC2.
PROOF
Necessity follows from lemmas 2 and 5. We establish sufficiency.
Since URC1 and URC2 hold, we know from lemma 4 that ∗∗ is complete so that it
is a weak order. This implies that ∗ is a weak order. Since Γ/∼∗∗ is finite or countably
infinite, it is clear that Γ/∼∗ is finite or countably infinite. Therefore, there is a real-valued
function q on Γ2 such that, for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ, (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ) ⇔ q(α, β) ≥ q(γ, δ).
Given a particular numerical representation q of ∗, let p(α, β) = q(α, β)− q(β, α). It is
obvious that p is skew symmetric and represents ∗∗.
Define F as follows:
F (p(a1, b1), p(a2, b2), . . . , p(an, bn)) =
{
exp(
∑n
i=1 p(ai, bi)) if a  b,
− exp(−∑ni=1 p(ai, bi)) otherwise.
The well-definedness of F follows from (4). To show that F is nondecreasing, suppose
that p(α, β) ≥ p(γ, δ), i.e. that (α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ). If γia  δib, we know from (3) that
αia  βib and the conclusion follows from the definition of F . If Not [γia  δib], we
have either Not [αia  βib] or αia  βib. In either case, the conclusion follows from the
definition of F . Since  is reflexive, we have F (0) ≥ 0, as required. This completes the
proof. 
Remark 1
Following Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002), it is not difficult to extend theorem 1 to sets of
arbitrary cardinality adding a, necessary, condition implying that the weak order ∗ (and,
hence, ∗∗) has a numerical representation. This will not be useful here and we leave the
details to the interested reader.
We refer to Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002) for an analysis of the, obviously quite weak,
uniqueness properties of the numerical representation of model (UM). Observe that, if 
has a representation in model (UM), we must have that:
(α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ) ⇒ p(α, β) > p(γ, δ). (5)
Hence, the number of distinct values taken by p in a representation in model (UM) is an
upper bound of the number of distinct equivalence classes of ∗∗. •
Remark 2
Following the analysis in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002), it is not difficult to analyze variants
of model (UM). For instance, when Γ is finite or countably infinite:
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• the weakening of model (UM) obtained considering a function p that may not be
skew symmetric but is such that p(α, α) = 0, for all α ∈ Γ, is equivalent to suppos-
ing that  is reflexive, independent and satisfies URC1,
• the weakening of model (UM) obtained considering a function F that may not be
nondecreasing is equivalent to supposing that  is reflexive and independent,
• the strengthening of model (UM) obtained considering a function F that is odd
(F (x) = −F (x)) is equivalent to supposing that  is complete and satisfies URC1
and URC2.
In Bouyssou and Pirlot (2004c), we study the strengthening of model (UM) obtained
requiring that F that is odd and strictly increasing in each of its arguments. In the finite
or countably infinite case, this model is shown to be characterized by the completeness
of and the “Cardinal Coordinate Independence” condition introduced in Wakker (1984,
1988, 1989) in order to derive the SEU model. This condition implies both URC1 and
URC2 for complete relations.
All the above results are easily generalized to cover the case of an arbitrary set of
consequences adding appropriate conditions guaranteeing that ∗ has a numerical repre-
sentation (on these conditions, see Fishburn, 1970; Krantz et al., 1971) •
5 A new characterization of LD relations
We have analyzed in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2004c) the relations between model (UM)
and models (SEU) and (SSA). We show here what has to be added to the conditions of
theorem 1 in order to characterize LD relations. The basic intuition behind this analysis
is quite simple. Consider a binary relation  that has a representation in model (UM)
in which the function p takes at most three distinct values, i.e. a positive value, a null
value and a negative value. In such a case, it is tempting to define the relation S letting
α P β ⇔ p(α, β) > 0 and α I β ⇔ p(α, β) = 0. Since p takes only three distinct
values, the relation S summarizes without any loss the information contained in the skew
symmetric function p. This brings us quite close to a LD relation. We formalize this
intuition below. This will require the introduction of conditions that will limit the number
of equivalence classes of ∼∗ and, therefore, ∼∗∗.
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Definition 4 (Conditions UM1 and UM2)
Let  be a binary relation on a set A. This relation is said to satisfy:
UM1 if
αia  βib
and
γjc  δjd

⇒


βia  αib
or
δia  γib
or
αjc  βjd,
UM2 if
αia  βib
and
βjc  αjd

⇒


βia  αib
or
γia  δib
or
γjc  δjd,
for all i, j ∈ N , all a, b, c, d ∈ A and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ.
In order to analyze these two conditions, it will be useful to introduce the following two
conditions:
αia  βib
and
γjc  δjd

⇒


βia  αib
or
αjc  βjd,
(6)
αia  βib
and
βjc  αjd

⇒


βia  αib
or
γjc  δjd,
(7)
for all i, j ∈ N , all a, b, c, d ∈ A and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ. Condition (6) has a simple
interpretation. Suppose that αia  βib and Not [βia  αib]. This is the sign that the
preference difference between α and β is strictly larger than the preference difference
between β and α. Because with LD relations there can be only three types of preference
differences (positive, null and negative) and preference differences are compared in a
reversible way, this implies that the preference difference between α and β must be at
least as large as any other preference difference. In particular, if γjc  δjd, it must follow
that αjc  βjd. This is what condition (6) implies. Condition (7) has an obvious dual
interpretation: if a difference is strictly smaller than its opposite then any other preference
must be at least as large as this difference. Conditions UM1 and UM2 are respectively
deduced from (6) and (7) by adding a conclusion to these conditions. This additional
conclusion ensures that these new conditions are independent from URC1 and URC2.
This is formalized below.
Lemma 6
1. (6) ⇔ [Not [(β, α) ∗ (α, β)] ⇒ (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ)],
2. (7) ⇔ [Not [(β, α) ∗ (α, β)] ⇒ (γ, δ) ∗ (β, α)],
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3. (6) ⇒ UM1,
4. (7) ⇒ UM2,
5. URC2 and UM1 ⇒ (6),
6. URC1 and UM2 ⇒ (7),
7. [URC1,URC2,UM1 and UM2]⇒ [∗∗ is a weak order having at most three equiv-
alence classes].
8. In the class of reflexive relations, URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2 are independent
conditions.
PROOF
Part 1. We clearly have Not [(6)] ⇔ [Not [(β, α) ∗ (α, β)] and Not [(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ)]].
The proof of part 2 is similar. Parts 3 and 4 are obvious since UM1 (resp. UM2) amounts
to adding a possible conclusion to (6) (resp. (7)).
Part 5. Suppose that αia  βib and γjc  δjd. If Not [δja  γjb], UM1 implies
βia  αib or αjc  βjd. Suppose now that δja  γjb. Using URC2 δia  γib and
γja  δjb imply βia  αib or αja  βjb. Hence, (6) holds.
Part 6. Suppose that αia  βib and βjc  αjd. If Not [γia  δib], UM2 implies
βia  αib or γjc  δjd. Suppose now that γia  δib. Using URC1 γia  δib and
βjc  αjd imply βia  αib or γjc  δjd. Hence, (7) holds.
Part 7. Since URC1 and URC2 hold, we know that ∗∗ is complete. Since ∗∗ is
reversible, the conclusion will be false iff there are α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ such that (α, β) ∗∗
(γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, α).
1. Suppose that (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ) and (γ, δ) ∗ (α, α). Using URC2, we know that
(α, α) ∗ (δ, γ). Using the transitivity of ∗ we have (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ). Since
(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ), this contradicts (6).
2. Suppose that (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ) and (α, α) ∗ (δ, γ). Using URC2, we know that
(γ, δ) ∗ (α, α). Using the transitivity of ∗ we have (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ). Since
(α, β) ∗ (γ, δ), this contradicts (6).
3. Suppose that (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α) and (γ, δ) ∗ (α, α). Using URC2, we know that
(α, α) ∗ (δ, γ) so that (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ). Since (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α), this contradicts (7).
4. Suppose that (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α) and (α, α) ∗ (δ, γ). Using URC2 we have (γ, δ) ∗
(α, α) so that (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ). Since (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α), this contradicts (7).
Part 8: see examples 4, 5, 6 and 7 in appendix. 
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In view of the above lemma, conditions UM1 and UM2 seem to adequately capture the
ordinal character of the aggregation at work in a LD relation within the framework of
model (UM). Indeed, the following lemma shows that all LD relations satisfy UM1 and
UM2 while having a representation in model (UM).
Lemma 7
Let  be a binary relation on A. If  is a LD relation then,
1.  satisfies URC1 and URC2,
2.  satisfies UM1 and UM2.
PROOF
Let 〈, S〉 be the representation of .
Part 1. Let us show that URC1 holds, i.e. that αia  βib and γjc  δjd imply
γia  δib or αjc  βjd.
There are 9 cases to envisage:
γ P δ γ I δ δ P γ
α P β (i) (ii) (iii)
α I β (iv) (v) (vi)
β P α (vii) (viii) (ix)
Cases (i), (v) and (ix) clearly follow from (2). All other cases easily follow from (2) and
the monotonicity of . The proof for URC2 is similar.
Part 2. Let us show that UM1 holds, i.e. that αia  βib and γjc  δjd imply βia  αib
or γia  δib or αjc  βjd.
If α P β then, using (2) and the monotonicity of , γjc  δjd implies αjc  βjd.
If β P α then, using (2) and the monotonicity of , αia  βib implies βia  αib. If
α I β, then β I α so that, using (2), αia  βib implies βia  αib. The proof for UM2 is
similar. 
We are now in position to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2
Let  be a binary relation on A. Then  is a LD relation iff it is reflexive and satisfies
URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2.
PROOF
Necessity follows from lemma 7 and the definition of a LD relation. We show that if
 satisfies URC1 and URC2 and is such that ∼∗∗ has at most three distinct equivalence
classes then  is a LD relation. In view of lemma 6, this will establish sufficiency.
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Define S letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ, α S β ⇔ (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β). By hypothesis, we
know that ∗∗ is complete and  is independent. It easily follows that S is complete.
The relation∗ being complete, the influence of i ∈ N implies that there are γ, δ, α, β ∈
Γ such that (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ). Since ∗∗ is complete, this implies (α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ). If
(α, β) ∗∗ (β, β) then α P β. If not, then (β, β) ∗∗ (α, β) so that (β, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ)
and, using the reversibility of ∗∗ and the independence of , δ P γ. This shows that P
is not empty. This implies that ∗∗ has exactly three distinct equivalence classes, since
α P β ⇔ (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β) ⇔ (β, β) ∗∗ (β, α). Therefore, α P β iff (α, β) belongs
to the first equivalence class of ∗∗ and (β, α) to its last equivalence class. Consider any
two subsets A,B ⊆ N such that A ∪B = N and let:
A  B ⇔ [a  b, for some a, b ∈ A such that S(a, b) = A and S(b, a) = B].
If a  b then, by construction, we have S(a, b)  S(b, a). Suppose now that S(a, b) 
S(b, a), so that there are c, b ∈ A such that c  d and (ci, di) ∼∗∗ (ai, bi), for all i ∈ N .
Using (4), we have a  b. Hence (2) holds. The monotonicity of  easily follows from
(3). This completes the proof. 
We have therefore obtained a complete characterization of LD relation within the
general framework of model (UM). Conditions UM1 and UM2 implying that ∗∗ has at
most three distinct equivalence classes appear as the main distinctive characteristic of LD
relations. Clearly a binary relation  having a representation in models (SEU) or (SSA)
will, in general, have a much richer relation ∗∗.
6 Discussion and extensions
The purpose of this paper was twofold. We have first introduced a general axiomatic
framework for decision under uncertainty that contains both the SEU and the LD models
as particular cases. This model, while tolerating intransitive and/or incomplete prefer-
ences, has a simple and intuitive interpretation in terms of preference differences. It
is nontrivial unlike, e.g., the general model introduced in Chu and Halpern (2003). We
showed that it can be characterized using simple conditions, while avoiding the use of any
unnecessary structural assumptions. The second aim of this paper was to put our general
framework to work, using it to propose an alternative characterization of the preference
relations that can be obtained using the likely dominance rule. This characterization has
emphasized the main specific feature of LD relations, i.e. the fact that they use a very
poor information concerning preference differences admitting only “positive”, “null” and
“negative” differences.
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6.1 Comparison with Fargier and Perny (1999) and Dubois et al.
(2003a)
We compare below our characterization of LD relations with the one proposed in Fargier
and Perny (1999); closely related results are found in Dubois et al. (2003a, 2002). Their
characterization is based on a condition called “qualitative independence” (and later called
“ordinal invariance” in Dubois et al. (2003a, 2002)) that is a slight variant (using a reflex-
ive relation instead of an asymmetric one) of the “noncompensation” condition introduced
in Fishburn (1975, 1976, 1978) which, in turn, is a “single profile” analogue of the inde-
pendence condition used in Arrow’s theorem (see Sen, 1986).
Since our definition of LD relations differs from the one used in Fargier and Perny
(1999) (they do not impose that  is necessarily monotonic w.r.t. inclusion) we reformu-
late their result below. For any a, b ∈ A, let R(a, b) = {i ∈ N : ai Γ bi}.
Definition 5
Let  be a binary relation on A. This relation is said to satisfy monotonic qualitative
independence (MQI) if,
R(a, b) ⊇ R(c, d)
and
R(b, a) ⊆ R(d, c)

⇒ [c  d ⇒ a  b],
for all a, b, c, d ∈ A.
Condition MQI is strengthens the “qualitative independence” condition used in Fargier
and Perny (1999) (this condition is obtained replacing inclusions by equalities in the ex-
pression of MQI; as observed in Dubois et al. (2003a, 2002), it is also possible to use
instead of MQI the original qualitative independence condition together with a condition
imposing that  is monotonic w.r.t. Γ) to include an idea of monotonicity. Condition
MQI is a “single profile” analogue of the NIM (i.e., Neutrality, Independence, Mono-
tonicity) condition that is classical in Social Choice Theory (see Sen, 1986, p. 1086).
As shown below, in what is an adaptation of Fargier and Perny (1999, proposition 5),
this condition allows for a very simple characterization of LD relations.
Proposition 1
Let  be a binary relation on A. The relation  is a LD relation iff
•  is reflexive,
• Γ is complete,
•  satisfies MQI.
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PROOF
Necessity. Reflexivity holds by definition of a LD relation. That Γ must be complete
follows from part 3 of lemma 2. The necessity of MQI follows from (2), using the mono-
tonicity of  and part 7 of lemma 1.
Sufficiency. Let S = Γ. By hypothesis, S is complete. If Γ is empty, we have
R(a, b) = N for all a, b ∈ A. Using the reflexivity of  and MQI this implies that
a  b, for all a, b ∈ A and, hence, that all states i ∈ N are degenerate, contrary to our
hypothesis. Hence Γ = P is nonempty.
Let A,B ⊆ N such that A ∪ B = N . Since P is nonempty there are a, b ∈ A such
that S(a, b) = A and S(b, a) = B. Define  letting:
A  B ⇔ [a  b, for some a, b ∈ A such that S(a, b) = A and S(b, a) = B].
If a  b then, by construction, we have S(a, b)  S(b, a). Suppose now that S(a, b) 
S(b, a). By construction, there are c, d ∈ A such that c  d and S(c, d) = A and
S(d, c) = B. Using MQI, it follows that a  b. That  is monotonic w.r.t. inclusion
clearly follows from MQI. 
We refer to Dubois et al. (2002); Fargier and Perny (1999) for a thorough analysis of this
result, including a careful comparison of the above conditions with the classical ones used
in Savage (1954).
Although proposition 1 offers a simple characterization of LD relations, condition
MQI appears at the same time quite strong (this will be apparent if one tries to reformulate
MQI in terms of ) and wholly specific to LD relations. In our view, the characterization
of LD relations within model (UM) proposed above allows to better isolate what appears
to be the specific features of LD relations while showing their links with more classical
preference relations used in the field of decision under uncertainty.
It should also be stressed that the characterization of LD relations is far from be-
ing the only objective of the above-mentioned papers. Rather, their aim is to study the,
drastic, consequences of supposing that  is a LD relation and has nice transitivity prop-
erties (e.g.  being transitive or without circuits). This analysis, that is closely related to
Arrow-like theorems in Social Choice Theory (see Campbell and Kelly, 2002; Sen, 1986,
for overviews), illuminates the relations between the LD rule, possibility theory and non-
monotonic reasoning. Such an analysis is clearly independent from the path followed to
characterize LD relations.
6.2 Extensions
As already mentioned, model (UM) is the specialization to the case of decision making
under uncertainty of the conjoint measurement models proposed in Bouyssou and Pirlot
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(2002). It is not difficult to see that model (UM) not only allows for intransitive relations
 between acts but also for intransitive relation Γ between outcomes. This may be
seen as a limitation of model (UM). Indeed, whereas intransitivities are not unlikely
when comparing acts (see Fishburn, 1991), one would expect a much more well behaved
relation when it turns to comparing outcomes. We show in this section how to extend
our results to cover this case. Before doing so, let us stress that it is quite remarkable
that any transitivity hypothesis is unnecessary to obtain a complete characterization of
LD relations. As forcefully argued in Saari (1998), this seems to be an essential feature
of “ordinal” models.
Adapting the analysis in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2004a) to the case of decision under
uncertainty, let us first show that it is possible to specialize model (UM) in order introduce
a linear arrangement of the elements of Γ. We consider binary relations  on A that can
be represented as:
a  b ⇔ F (ϕ(u(a1), u(b1)), . . . , ϕ(u(an), u(bn))) ≥ 0 (UM*)
where u is a real-valued function on Γ, ϕ is a real-valued function on u(Γ)2 that is skew
symmetric, nondecreasing in its first argument (and, therefore, nonincreasing in its second
argument) and F is a real-valued function on ∏ni=1 ϕ(u(Γ)2) being nondecreasing in all
its arguments and such that F (0) ≥ 0.
Comparing models (UM*) and (UM), it is clear that (UM*) is the special case of
model (UM) in which the function p measuring preference differences between outcomes
may be factorised using a function u measuring the “utility” of the outcomes and a skew
symmetric function ϕ measuring preference differences between outcomes on the basis of
u. It is easy to see that model (UM*) implies thatΓ is complete and thatΓ is transitive.
The analysis below will, in fact, show that model (UM*) implies that Γ is a semiorder.
The analysis of model (UM*) will require the introduction of three new conditions
inspired from Bouyssou and Pirlot (2004a).
Definition 6 (Conditions UAC1, UAC2 and UAC3)
We say that  satisfies:
UAC1 if
αia  b
and
βjc  d

⇒


βia  b
or
αjc  d,
UAC2 if
a  αib
and
c  βjd

⇒


a  βib
or
c  αjd,
UAC3 if
a  αib
and
αjc  d

⇒


a  βib
or
βjc  d,
for all a, b, c, d ∈ A, all i, j ∈ N and all α, β ∈ Γ.
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Condition UAC1 suggests that the elements of Γ can be linearly ordered considering “up-
ward dominance”: if α “upward dominates” β then βia  b entails αia  b, for all
a, b ∈ A and all i ∈ N . Condition UAC2 has a similar interpretation considering now
“downward dominance”. Condition UAC3 ensures that the linear arrangements of the ele-
ments of Γ obtained considering upward and downward dominance are not incompatible.
The study of the impact of these new conditions on model (UM) will require an additional
definition borrowed from Doignon et al. (1988).
Definition 7 (Linearity)
Let R be a binary relation on a set X2. We say that:
• R is right-linear iff [Not [(y, z) R (x, z)] ⇒ (x,w) R (y, w)],
• R is left-linear iff [Not [(z, x) R (z, y)] ⇒ (w, y) R (w, x)],
• R is strongly linear iff [Not [(y, z) R (x, z)] or Not [(z, x) R (z, y)]] ⇒ [(x,w) R
(y, w) and (w, y) R (w, x)],
for all x, y, z, w ∈ X .
The impact of our new conditions on the relations ∗ and ∗∗ comparing preference
differences between outcomes are noted below.
Lemma 8
1. UAC1 ⇔ ∗ is right-linear,
2. UAC2 ⇔ ∗ is left-linear,
3. UAC3 ⇔ [[Not [(α, γ) ∗ (β, γ)] for some γ ∈ Γ] ⇒ [(δ, α) ∗ (δ, β), for all
δ ∈ Γ]],
4. [UAC1, UAC2 and UAC3] ⇔ ∗ is strongly linear ⇔ ∗∗ is strongly linear.
5. In the class of reflexive relations satisfying URC1 and URC2, UAC1, UAC2 and
UAC3 are independent conditions.
PROOF
Part 1. ∗ is not right-linear iff for some α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ, we have Not [(γ, β) ∗ (α, β)]
and Not [(α, δ) ∗ (γ, δ)]. This equivalent to
[αia  βib] and Not [γia  βib] and
[γjc  δjd] and Not [αjc  δjd],
for some a, b, c, d ∈ A and some i, j ∈ N . This is exactly Not [UAC1]. Parts 2 and 3 are
established similarly.
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Part 4. The first equivalence is immediate from parts 1 to 3. The second equivalence
directly results from the definitions of ∗ and ∗∗.
Part 5: see examples 8, 9 and 10 in appendix. 
We summarize some useful consequences of model (UM*) in the following:
Lemma 9
Let  be a binary relation on A. If  has a representation in (UM*) then:
1. it satisfies URC1 and URC2,
2. it satisfies UAC1, UAC2 and UAC3,
3. the binary relation T on Γ defined by α T β ⇔ (α, β) ∗∗ (α, α) is a semiorder.
PROOF
Part 1 follows from the definition of model (UM*) and theorem 1.
Part 2. Suppose that αia  b and βjc  d. This implies, abusing notation,
F ([ϕ(u(α), u(bi))]i, [ϕ(u(ak), u(bk))]k =i) ≥ 0 and
F ([ϕ(u(β), u(dj))]j, [ϕ(u(c), u(d))]=j) ≥ 0.
If u(β) < u(α), since ϕ is nondecreasing in its first argument and F is nondecreasing in
all its arguments, we obtain
F ([ϕ(u(α), u(dj))]j, [ϕ(u(c), u(d))]=j) ≥ 0,
so that αjc  d. If u(β) ≥ u(α), since ϕ is nondecreasing in its first argument and F is
nondecreasing in all its arguments, we obtain
F ([ϕ(u(β), u(bi))]i, [ϕ(u(ak), u(bk))]k =i) ≥ 0,
so that βia  b. Hence, UAC1 holds. The proof is similar for UAC2 and UAC3.
Part 3. Since URC1 and URC2 hold, we know from lemma 4 that ∗∗ is complete. It
is reversible by construction. From lemma 8, we know that ∗∗ is strongly linear. From
the proof of theorem 2, we know that T is complete. It remains to show that it is Ferrers
and semi-transitive.
[Ferrers]. Suppose that α T β and γ T δ so that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β) and (γ, δ) ∗∗
(δ, δ). In contradiction with the thesis, suppose that Not [α T δ] and Not [γ T β] so that
(δ, δ) ∗∗ (α, δ) and (β, β) ∗∗ (γ, β). Using the fact that ∗∗ is a weak order, this
implies (α, β) ∗∗ (γ, β) and (γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, δ). This violates the strong linearity of ∗∗.
66
Annales du LAMSADE n◦3
[Semi-transitivity]. Suppose that α T β and β T γ so that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β)
and (β, γ) ∗∗ (γ, γ). In contradiction with the thesis, suppose that Not [α T δ] and
Not [δ T γ] so that (δ, δ) ∗∗ (α, δ) and (γ, γ) ∗∗ (δ, γ). Using the fact that ∗∗ is a
reversible weak order, we obtain (α, β) ∗∗ (α, δ) and (β, γ) ∗∗ (δ, γ). This violates
the strong linearity of ∗∗. Hence, T is semi-transitive. 
The conditions introduced so far allow us to characterize model (UM*) when Γ and,
hence, A, is at most denumerable.
Theorem 3
Suppose that Γ is finite or countably infinite and let  be a binary relation on A. Then
 has a representation (UM*) iff it is reflexive and satisfies URC1, URC2, UAC1, UAC2
and UAC3.
PROOF
Necessity results from lemmas 2, 5 and 9. The proof of sufficiency rests on the following
claim proved in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2004a, Proposition 2).
CLAIM Let R be a weak order on a finite or countably infinite set X2. There is a real-
valued function u on X and a real-valued function ϕ on u(X)2 being nondecreasing in its
first argument and nonincreasing in its second argument, such that, for all x, y, z, w ∈ X ,
(x, y) R (z, w) ⇔ ϕ(u(x), u(y)) ≥ ϕ(u(z), u(w))
iff R is strongly linear. In addition, the function ϕ can be chosen to be skew-symmetric
iff R is reversible.
Sufficiency follows from combining theorem 1 with lemma 8 and the above claim. 
Remark 3
The above result can be extended without much difficulty to sets of arbitrary cardinality.
Note however that, contrary to theorem 1, theorem 3 is only stated here for finite or count-
ably infinite sets A. This is no mistake. In fact, as shown in Fishburn (1973, Theorem
A(ii)), it may well happen that R is a strongly linear weak order on X2, that the set of
equivalence classes induced by R is finite or countably infinite while the above claim
fails. •
We now use the framework of model (UM*) to analyze LD relations in which S is a
semiorder. Let us first show that all such relations have a representation in model (UM*).
Lemma 10
Let  be a binary relation on A. If  is a LD relation with a representation 〈, S〉 in
which S is a semiorder then  satisfies UAC1, UAC2 and UAC3.
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PROOF
[UAC1]. Suppose that αia  b and βjc  d. We want to show that either βia  b or
αjc  d.
If bi P α or dj P β, the conclusion follows from the monotonicity of .
If α P bi and β P dj , we have, using the fact that P is Ferrers, α P dj or β P bi. In
either case the desired conclusion follows using the fact that  is a LD relation.
This leaves three exclusive cases: [α I bi and β P dj] or [α P bi and β I dj], or [α I bi
and β I dj]. Using Ferrers, either case implies α S dj or β S bi. If either α P dj or
β P bi, the desired conclusion follows from monotonicity. Suppose therefore that α I dj
and β I bi. Since we have either α I bi or β I dj , the conclusion follows using the fact
that  is a LD relation.
Hence UAC1 holds. The proof for UAC2 is similar, using Ferrers.
[UAC3]. Suppose that a  αib and αjc  d. We want to show that either a  βib or
βjc  d.
If either α P ai or dj P α, the conclusion follows from monotonicity.
If ai P α and α P dj , then semi-transitivity implies ai P β or β P dj . In either case,
the conclusion follows from monotonicity.
This leaves three exclusive cases: [ai I α and α P dj] or [ai P α and α I dj] or
[ai I α and α I dj]. In either case, semi-transitivity implies ai S β or β S dj . If either
ai P β or β P dj . the desired conclusion follows from monotonicity. Suppose therefore
that ai I β or β I dj . Since in each of the remaining cases we have either ai I α or α I dj ,
the conclusion follows because  is a LD relation. 
Although lemma 8 shows that in the class of reflexive binary relations satisfying URC1
and URC2, UAC1, UAC2 and UAC3 are independent conditions, the situation is more
delicate when we bring conditions UM1 and UM2 into the picture since they impose
strong requirements on ∗ and ∗∗. We have:
Lemma 11
1. Let  be a reflexive binary relation on A satisfying URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2.
Then  satisfies UAC1 iff it satisfies UAC2.
2. In the class of reflexive binary relations satisfying URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2,
conditions UAC1 and UAC3 are independent.
PROOF
Part 1. The proof uses the following claim.
CLAIM When URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2 hold then we have one of the following:
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1. (α, β) ∗ (β, β) ∗ (β, α), for all α, β ∈ Γ such that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β),
2. (α, β) ∗ (β, β) and (β, β) ∼∗ (β, α), for all α, β ∈ Γ such that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β),
3. (α, β) ∼∗ (β, β) and (β, β) ∗ (β, α), for all α, β ∈ Γ such that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β),
PROOF OF THE CLAIM
Using part 3 of lemma 4 and part 8 of lemma 8, we know that ∗∗ is a weak order having
at most three distinct equivalence classes. Let α, β ∈ Γ be such that (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β).
By construction, we have either (α, β) ∗ (β, β) or (β, β) ∗ (β, α). There are three
cases to examine.
1. Suppose first that (α, β) ∗ (β, β) and (β, β) ∗ (β, α). Consider γ, δ ∈ Γ such
that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ). If either (γ, δ) ∼∗ (δ, δ) or (δ, γ) ∼∗ (δ, δ), it is easy to see,
using the independence of  and the definition of ∗∗, that we must have:
(α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ) ∗∗ (β, β) ∗∗ (δ, γ) ∗∗ (β, α),
violating the fact that ∼∗∗ has at most three distinct equivalence classes. Hence we
have, for all γ, δ ∈ Γ such that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ), (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ).
2. Suppose that (α, β) ∗ (β, β) and (β, β) ∼∗ (β, α) and consider any γ, δ ∈ Γ such
that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ). If (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ), we have, using the
independence of  and the definition of ∗∗,
(γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β) ∗∗ (β, α) ∗∗ (δ, γ),
violating the fact that∼∗∗ has at most three distinct equivalence classes. If (γ, δ) ∼∗
(δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ), then URC2 is violated since we have (α, β) ∗ (γ, δ)
and (β, α) ∗ (δ, γ). Hence, it must be true that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ) implies (γ, δ) ∗
(δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∼∗ (δ, γ).
3. Suppose that (α, β) ∼∗ (β, β) and (β, β) ∗ (β, α) and consider any γ, δ ∈ Γ such
that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ). If (γ, δ) ∗ (δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ), we have, using the
independence of  and the definition of ∗∗,
(γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, β) ∗∗ (β, β) ∗∗ (β, α) ∗∗ (δ, γ),
violating the fact that∼∗∗ has at most three distinct equivalence classes. If (γ, δ) ∗
(δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∼∗ (δ, γ), then URC2 is violated since we have (γ, δ) ∗ (α, β)
and (δ, γ) ∗ (β, α). Hence, it must be true that (γ, δ) ∗∗ (δ, δ) implies (γ, δ) ∼∗
(δ, δ) and (δ, δ) ∗ (δ, γ).
This proves the claim.
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We prove that UAC1 ⇒ UAC2, the proof of the reverse implication being similar.
Suppose UAC2 is violated so that, for some a, b, c, d ∈ A and some α, β ∈ Γ, we have
a  αib c  βjd, Not [a  βib], Not [c  αjd].
This implies (α, β) ∗ (α, δ) and (γ, δ) ∗ (γ, β), so that (α, β) ∗∗ (α, δ) and
(γ, δ) ∗∗ (γ, β).
Because, URC1, URC2, UM1 and UM2 hold, we know that we must be in one of the
cases of the above claim.
If either of the last two cases hold, ∗ has at most two distinct equivalence classes, so
that (α, β) ∼∗ (γ, δ) and (α, δ) ∼∗ (γ, β). This implies (γ, δ) ∗ (α, δ) and (α, β) ∗
(γ, β). Since UAC1 implies the right-linearity of ∗, (γ, δ) ∗ (α, δ) implies (γ, β) ∗
(α, β), a contradiction.
Suppose that the first case holds true. We distinguish several subcases.
1. If both (α, β) and (γ, δ) belong to the middle equivalence class of ∗, we have
[(α, β) ∼∗ (γ, δ)] ∗ [(α, δ) ∼∗ (γ, β)]. As shown above, this leads to a contradic-
tion.
2. Suppose that both (α, β) and (γ, δ) belong to the first equivalence class of ∗. We
therefore have (α, β) ∼∗ (γ, δ), (α, β) ∗ (α, δ) and (γ, δ) ∗ (γ, β). This implies
(α, β) ∗ (γ, β). Using UAC1, we have (α, δ) ∗ (γ, δ), a contradiction.
3. Suppose that (α, β) belongs to the first equivalence class of∗ and (γ, δ) belongs to
the central class of ∗. This implies, using the reversibility of ∗∗ and the fact that
it has at most three equivalence classes, [(α, β) ∼∗ (β, γ)] ∗ [(γ, δ) ∼∗ (δ, γ)] ∗
[(γ, β) ∼∗ (β, α)]. Hence, we have (β, γ) ∗ (δ, γ) and using UAC1, we have
(β, α) ∗ (δ, α), a contradiction.
Part 2: see examples 11 and 12 in appendix 
This leads to a characterization of LD relations in which S is a semiorder.
Theorem 4
Let  be a binary relation on A. Then  is a LD relation having a representation 〈, S〉
in which S is a semiorder iff it is reflexive and satisfies URC2, UM1, UM2, UAC1 and
UAC3.
PROOF
The proof of theorem 4 follows from combining lemmas 9, 10 and 11 with the results in
section 5. 
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Let us finally mention that in our definition of LD relations in section 3, the only remark-
able property imposed on  is monotonicity w.r.t. inclusion. In most instances, we would
expect  to be transitive as well. It is easy to devise conditions that imply the transitivity
of . We leave the details to the interested reader.
Appendices
A Examples related to model (UM)
Example 2 (URC2, Not [URC1])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ} and N = {1, 2}. Let on A identical to A2 except that, using obvious
notation, Not [α1γ2  β1α2] and Not [γ1α2  α1β2].
It is easy to see that  is complete (and, hence, reflexive). It violates URC1 since
α1α2  β1β2 and γ1γ2  α1α2 but neither α1γ2  β1α2 nor γ1α2  α1β2.
It is not difficult to check that we have:
• [(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (α, γ), (β, α), (β, γ), (γ, β)] ∗ (α, β) and
• [(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (α, γ), (β, α), (β, γ), (γ, β)] ∗ (γ, α),
while (α, β) and (γ, α) are incomparable in terms of ∗. Using part 2 of lemma 4, it is
easy to check that  satisfies URC2. 
Example 3 (URC1, Not [URC2])
Let Γ = {α, β} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table (to be read from
line to column):
p α β
α 0 −1
β 1 1
It is easy to see that  is complete (and hence, reflexive) and satisfies URC1 (we have:
[(β, β) ∼∗ (β, α)] ∗ (α, α) ∗ (α, β)). The relation  is not independent since β1α2 
β1β2 but Not [α1α2)  α1β2]. Hence, URC2 is violated in view of part 5 of lemma 4. 
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B Examples related to LD relations
Example 4 (URC1, URC2, UM2, Not [UM1])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ p1(a1, b1) + p2(a2, b2) ≥ 0,
where p1 and p2 are real valued functions on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p1 α β γ
α 0 4 0
β 0 0 0
γ 0 0 0
p2 α β γ
α 0 0 0
β −3 0 0
γ −3 −3 0
The relation  is clearly complete. It is not difficult to see that ∗ is such that:
(α, β) ∗ [(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (α, γ), (β, γ)] ∗ [(β, α), (γ, α), (γ, β)].
This shows, in view of lemma 4, that URC1 and URC2 are satisfied. It is easy to
check that (7) holds, so that the same is true for UM2. We have (α, γ) ∗ (γ, α) but
Not [(α, γ) ∗ (α, β)]. This shows that (6) is violated. Since URC2 holds, this shows that
UM1 is violated in view of part 5 of lemma 6. 
Example 5 (URC1, URC2, UM1, Not [UM2])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p1(a1, b1) + p2(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p1 and p2 are real valued functions on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p1 α β γ
α 0 2 2
β −2 0 2
γ −4 −2 0
p2 α β γ
α 0 0 0
β −2 0 0
γ −2 −2 0
and g is such that:
g(x) =
{
x if |x| > 2,
0 otherwise.
The relation  is clearly complete. It is not difficult to see that ∗ is such that:
[(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (α, β), (α, γ), (β, γ)] ∗ [(β, α), (γ, β)] ∗ (γ, α).
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This shows, in view of lemma 4, that URC1 and URC2 are satisfied. It is easy to
check that (6) holds, so that the same is true for UM1. We have (α, β) ∗ (β, α) but
Not [(γ, α) ∗ (β, α)]. This shows that (7) is violated. Since URC1 holds, this shows that
UM2 is violated in view of part 6 of lemma 6. 
Example 6 (URC1, UM1, UM2, Not [URC2])
Let Γ = {α, β} and N = {1, 2}. Let onA be identicalA2 except thatNot [β1β2  α1α2]
and Not [β1β2  α1β2]. This relation is clearly complete. It is not independent, so that
URC2 is violated in view of lemma 4. We have: [(α, α), (α, β)] ∗ (β, β) ∗ (β, α).
Since ∗ is complete, URC1 holds. In view of parts 1 and 2 of lemma 6, we know that
(6) and (7) hold. Hence, UM1 and UM2 hold. 
Example 7 (URC2, UM1, UM2, Not [URC1])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ} and N = {1, 2, 3}. Let  on A be identical to A2 except that the
following 25 relations are missing: α1α2α3  γ1α2γ3, α1α2α3  γ1β2γ3, α1α2α3 
γ1γ2γ3, α1β2α3  α1α2γ3, α1β2α3  β1α2γ3, α1β2α3  γ1α2γ3, α1β2α3  γ1β2γ3,
α1β2α3  γ1γ2γ3, α1γ2α3  γ1α2γ3, α1γ2α3  γ1β2γ3, α1γ2α3  γ1γ2γ3, β1β2α3 
α1α2α3, β1β2α3  α1α2β3, β1β2α3  α1α2γ3, β1β2α3  β1α2γ3, β1β2α3  γ1α2γ3,
β1β2β3  α1α2α3, β1β2β3  α1α2β3, β1β2β3  α1α2γ3, β1β2γ3  α1α2α3, β1β2γ3 
α1α2β3, β1β2γ3  α1α2γ3, γ1β2α3  α1α2γ3, γ1β2α3  β1α2γ3 and γ1β2α3  γ1α2γ3.
It is not difficult to check that  is complete. We have:
[(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (β, γ), (γ, α), (γ, β), (γ, β)] ∗ (α, γ) and
[(α, α), (β, β), (γ, γ), (β, γ), (γ, α), (γ, β), (γ, β)] ∗ (β, α),
while (α, γ) and (β, α) are nor comparable in terms of ∗. This shows that URC1 is
violated. Using part 2 of lemma 4, it is easy to check that URC2 holds. Using part 1 of
lemma 6, it is easy to check that (6) holds. In view of part 3 of lemma 6, this shows that
UM1 is satisfied. It remains to check that UM2 holds.
It is not difficult to check that β2a  α2b implies τ2a  σ2b, for all a, b ∈ A and all
(τ, σ) ∈ Γ2. Furthermore, for all (τ, σ), (χ, ψ) ∈ Γ2 \ (β, α), χ2a  ψ2b ⇔ τ2a  σ2b.
Similarly, it is easy to check that α3a  γ3b implies τ3a  σ3b, for all a, b ∈ A and all
(τ, σ) ∈ Γ2. Furthermore, for all (τ, σ), (χ, ψ) ∈ Γ2 \ (α, γ), χ3a  ψ3b⇔ τ3a  σ3b.
The two premises of UM2 are that τia  σib and σjc  τjd. The three possible
conclusions of UM2 are that σia  τib or χia  ψib or χjc  ψjd.
Suppose first that (τ, σ) is distinct from (γ, α) and (α, β). In this case, we know that
(σ, τ) ∗ (τ, σ), so that τia  σib implies σia  τib. Hence, the first conclusion of UM2
will hold.
Suppose henceforth that (τ, σ) = (γ, α). If i = 2, we know that γ2a  α2b ⇔
α2a  γ2b, so that the first conclusion of UM2 will hold.
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Suppose that i = 3. If j = 3, the second premise of UM2 becomes α3c  γ3d. This
implies γ3c  α3d so that the last conclusion of UM2 will hold. A similar reasoning
shows that the last conclusion of UM2 will hold if j = 1. Suppose that j = 2. The two
premises of UM2 are that γ3a  α3b and α2c  γ2d. The three desired conclusions are
that either γ3a  α3b or χ3a  ψ3b or χ2c  ψ2d. If (χ, ψ) is distinct from (β, α), we
know that α2c  γ2d⇔ χ2c  ψ2d so that the last conclusion of UM2 will hold. Now if
(χ, ψ) = (β, α), we have that β3a  α3b so that the second conclusion of UM2 holds.
Suppose that i = 1. If (χ, ψ) is distinct from (β, α), γ1a  α1b will imply χ1a  ψ1b,
so that the second conclusion of UM2 will hold. If (χ, ψ) = (β, α), it is easy to check
that there is no a, b ∈ A such that γ1a  α1b, Not [α1a  γ1b] and Not [β1a  α1b]. This
shows that UM2 cannot be violated.
Hence, we have shown that UM2 holds if (τ, σ) = (γ, α). A similar reasoning shows
that UM2 holds if (τ, σ) = (α, β). 
C Examples related to model (UM*)
Throughout the remaining examples, we use the following notation:
α ± β ⇔ [(α, γ) ∗ (β, γ) and (δ, β) ∗ (δ, α),∀γ, δ ∈ Γ] ,
α + β ⇔ [(α, γ) ∗ (β, γ),∀γ ∈ Γ] ,
α − β ⇔ [(δ, β) ∗ (δ, α),∀δ ∈ Γ] .
The reader will easily check that:
UAC1 ⇔ + is complete,
UAC2 ⇔ − is complete,
UAC3 ⇔ [α + β ⇒ Not [β − α]].
It is also interesting to note that:
α + β ⇔ [βic  d ⇒ αic  d,∀c, d ∈ A],
α − β ⇔ [d  αic ⇒ d  βic,∀c, d ∈ A],
α ± β ⇔ [α + β and α − β].
Example 8 (URC1, URC2, UAC2, UAC3, Not [UAC1])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, δ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table:
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p α β γ δ
α 0 −3 −1 2
β 3 0 1 2
γ 1 −1 0 2
δ −2 −2 −2 0
and g is such that:
g(x) =
{
x if |x| > 2,
0 otherwise.
The relation  is clearly complete and satisfies URC1 and URC2. It is not difficult to
check that we have:
β − γ − α − δ.
We have β + γ, γ + α and γ + δ but neither α + δ (because δ1α2  β1α2 but
Not [α1α2  β1α2]) nor δ + α (because α1α2  α1γ2 but Not [δ1α2  α1γ2]). This
shows that UAC2 and UAC3 hold but that UAC1 is violated. 
Example 9 (URC1, URC2, UAC1, UAC3, Not [UAC2])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, δ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p α β γ δ
α 0 3 1 −2
β −3 0 −1 −2
γ −1 1 0 −2
δ 2 2 2 0
and g is as in example 8.
The relation  is clearly complete and satisfies URC1 and URC2. Observe that p is
defined via the transposition of the table used in example 8. This interchanges the roles
of UAC1 and UAC2. In fact it is not difficult to see that we have:
δ + α + γ + β.
We have: δ − γ, α − γ, γ − β but neither α − δ nor δ − α. This shows that
UAC1 and UAC3 hold but that UAC2 is violated. 
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Example 10 (URC1, URC2, UAC1, UAC2, Not [UAC3])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, δ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p α β γ δ
α 0 −5 0 −2
β 5 0 1 2
γ 0 −1 0 0
δ 2 −2 0 0
and g is as in example 8.
The relation  is clearly complete and satisfies URC1 and URC2. We have:
β + γ + δ + α and
β − δ − γ − α.
This shows that UAC1 and UAC2 hold but that UAC3 is violated since γ + δ but
δ − γ. 
D Examples related to LD relations in which S is a semiorder
Example 11 (URC1, URC2, UM1, UM2, UAC1, UAC2, Not [UAC3])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, δ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p α β γ δ
α 0 −2 0 −2
β 2 0 0 2
γ 0 0 0 0
δ 2 −2 0 0
and g is as in example 8.
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The relation  is clearly complete and satisfies URC1 and URC2. Since p takes 3
distinct values, it is easy to see that UM1 and UM2 holds. We have:
[β, γ] + δ + α and
β − δ − [γ, α].
This shows that UAC1 and UAC2 hold but that UAC3 is violated since γ + δ but
δ − γ. 
Example 12 (URC1, URC2, UM1, UM2, UAC3, Not [UAC1], Not [UAC2])
Let Γ = {α, β, γ, δ} and N = {1, 2}. Let  on A be such that:
a  b ⇔ g(p(a1, b1) + p(a2, b2)) ≥ 0,
where p is a real valued function on Γ2 defined by the following table:
p α β γ δ
α 0 −2 −2 2
β 2 0 0 0
γ 2 0 0 2
δ −2 0 −2 0
and g is as in example 8.
The relation  is clearly complete and satisfies URC1 and URC2. Since p takes 3
distinct values, it is easy to see that UM1 and UM2 holds. It is easy to see that: β ∼+ γ,
β + α, β + δ, γ + α, γ + δ, but neither α + δ nor δ + α. Similarly we obtain:
γ − α, γ − β, γ − δ, α − δ, β − δ but neither α − β nor β − α. Hence
UAC3 holds but UAC1 and UAC2 are violated. 
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